In a seminal paper on Marxian business cycle theory Goodwin (1967) presented a model, which assumed that a higher wage share leads to lower investment and thus a general economic slowdown. In contrast Kalecki (1971) was arguing that a higher wage share would have an expansionary effect because the consumption propensity out of wage income is higher than that out of profit income. Based on a general model that allows for wage-led as well as profit-led demand regimes, this paper estimates the effects of a change in the wage share on aggregate private domestic demand with quarterly data for 12 OECD countries.
Introduction
In a seminal paper Goodwin (1967) presented a model of a Marxian business cycle, where a higher wage share depresses investment expenditures. Sluggish investment translates into higher unemployment, which in turn decreases the wage share. This in turn stimulates investment and eventually employment. Thus the wage share rises again and the cycle is complete. Later on Goodwin (1983 Goodwin ( , 1986 ) noted that once unemployment and flexible capacity utilization is allowed for, an increase in the wage share need not lead to a decrease in demand. This is what Kalecki had already been arguing much earlier: a rise in the wage share would actually stimulate demand as the consumption propensity out of wage income is higher than that of profit income. Therefore a rise in the wage share will boost consumption expenditures.
This disagreement is cause as well as a symptom of a divide in heterodox macroeconomics. While Marxists (certainly those in the Goodwin tradition) accept as a stylized fact that an increase in profits will ceteris paribus stimulate growth, Post Keynesians routinely assert the opposite (at least for the closed economy case). Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) proposed a general Post Keynesian macro model that incorporates effects on demand as well as on investment which consequently can give rise to wage-led as well as profit-led demand regimes (see also Barbosa-Filho and Taylor, 2006) . The profit-led demand regime can be considered the Goodwin case, the wage-led regime the Kaleckian case. However, associating these cases with the names of Goodwin and Kalecki respectively is admittedly somewhat arbitrary. While we will refer to the causal chain higher profit share → higher investment → higher aggregate demand (or growth) as the Goodwin-story, we might as well label it the 'Marx-story' or, indeed, the 'classical story'. In the light of the Bhaduri and Marglin model, the Goodwin story assumes that the effect of a change in income distribution on investment is stronger than that on consumption. Instead of Kalecki we might also refer to the Post Keynesian tradition in general when we refer to the causal chain higher wage share → higher consumption → higher aggregate demand. Implicit in Kalecki's argument is that the effect on consumption overpowers that on investment.
Two clarifications are necessary. First, the Goodwin-story and the Kaleckian story give sufficient conditions for demand to be profit led and wage led respectively. There could also be 'perverse' reasons for an economy to be profit led: if consumption reacted negatively to an increase in the wage (or if investment reacted positively to an increase in the wage share). Second, for any individual country there will also be an effect on net exports because given the level of productivity an increase in the wage share typically comes with an increase in prices, which implies a loss in international competitiveness (Blecker 1979 (Blecker , 1999 (Blecker , 2002 .
However, while empirically important, this international trade effect is not of further interest in our context, because there is no disagreement on it. The disagreement is on the domestic effects as both, the Goodwin and the Kalecki models are formulated in a closed economy setting. The disagreement between the two is about the relative size of the effects of a change in income distribution on consumption and on investment.
This paper contributes to the debates in heterodox macroeconomics on the empirical identification of distribution-led demand regimes. The question what the effects of a change in the wage share on private domestic demand is, will be investigated econometrically for 12 OECD countries. The estimation is based on model closely related to those of Bhaduri and Marglin (1990) and Barbosa-Filho and Tayor (2006) . The contribution of this paper lies in using quarterly data for a broad set of countries and having an explicit focus on the short term and on the domestic economy. As we are using several countries a panel might seem appropriate. However since we are using quarterly data there will be experimentation with the lag structure and it would seem overly restrictive to impose the same temporal structure on all countries. Thus separate equations are estimated separately for each country. While the Goodwin model is a model of the business cycle, this paper has a narrower focus: demand formation. Thus no complete test of the Goodwin model is intended. Rather one building block of the Goodwin model, that is, the demand side, is investigated.
Goodwin's as well as Kalecki's theory of income distribution is not subject of this paper.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical background and the model, on which the empirical estimations are based. Section 3 summarizes the empirical literature on these models. Section 4 presents the econometric results for the effect of changes in functional income distribution on private consumption, and private investment. Section 5 summarizes the key findings and discusses theoretical implications and policy conclusions.
Theoretical background: wage-led und profit-led demand regimes
This section will present the macroeconomic model that forms the basis for the empirical analysis of the effects of changes in functional income distribution on aggregate demand.
Aggregate demand (Y) is the sum of consumption (C), investment (I), net exports (NX) and government expenditure (G) where all variables are expressed in real terms. In a general formulation, consumption, investment and net exports are written as functions of income (Y), the wage share (W), and some other control variables (summarized as z) which are independent of output and distribution. A full macroeconomic model would also include the effects of international trade. However, the international trade effect will not be investigated any further in this paper mainly because the difference of the arguments of Kalecki and 
In the consumption function the basic assertion is that wage incomes and profit incomes are associated with different propensities to consume. The Kaleckian assumption is that the marginal propensity to consume is lower for capital incomes than for wage income;
consumption is therefore expected to increase when the wage share rises.
Investment depends positively on output (Y) and negatively on the wage share. In classical economics it was a straightforward assumption that the capital accumulation was a positive function of the rate of profit. Consequently investment ought to be a function of profits. Today it is often argued that retained earnings are a privileged source of finance and may thus influence investment expenditures.
Differentiating Y with respect to W and collecting terms gives
1 Net exports are a negative function of domestic demand, a positive function of foreign demand, and will depend negatively on unit labour costs, which are by definition closely related to the wage share, because they affect international competitiveness. (Blecker 1989 (Blecker , 2002 Stockhammer et al 2009) 2 Functional income distribution and its measure, the wage share, are used synonymously throughout this paper.
where
The term 1/(1-h 1 ) in equation (2) is a standard multiplier and has to be positive for stability.
The sign of the total derivative therefore depends on the sign of the numerator. h 2 is the sum of the partial derivatives of the components of demand with respect to income distribution.
This sum is private excess demand, that is, the change in demand caused by a change in income distribution given a certain level of income. It is impossible to sign h 2 a priori, since we hypothesize that ∂C/∂W>0 and ∂I/∂W<0. The sum of these effects can therefore only be determined empirically. Determining the sign of private domestic excess demand is the focus of the empirical estimations in this study.
The total effect of the increase in the wage share depends on the relative size of the reactions of the components of GDP, namely consumption and to changes in income Marglin and Bhaduri (1990) . From the empirical investigation it is concluded that unemployment is determined by the goods market, and that the impact of income distribution on demand and employment is very weak. Onaran and Stockhammer (2005) 
Empirical results
As we are interested in the short-run effects of distribution on demand difference specifications will be applied. ECM specifications were not applicable, because of lack of evidence of cointegration. One important question is how to deal with the contemporaneous interactions between demand and distribution. Including contemporaneous effects will lead to endogeneity problems. Moreover, Granger causality tests strongly suggest that the causality goes from consumption and investment to income distribution rather than the other direction.
quarterly data the bias due to omitted contemporaneous effects should be minor. Incorporating contemporaneous effects is a major challenge as it cannot be done on purely empirical grounds; thus some theoretical restrictions would have to be applied. Any such approach would have to rely on instruments and results would thus critically depend on the quality of these instruments. The following two baseline specifications will be used:
where c, i, y, and w are the logarithms of (private) real consumption, (private) real investment, real GDP and the wage share respectively; K denotes the number of lags included. In a variation we also use an error correction specification that allows for long -run effects:
The total effect on private excess demand, for convenience of interpretation expressed in percent of GDP, is the sum of the effects on consumption weighted by the consumption share in GDP and the inverse of the wage share plus the sum of the effects on investment weighted by investment share in GDP and the inverse of the wage share: In the econometric specifications the identification of the lag length is an important and delicate issue. Investigating the robustness of the results with respect to the specification and the lag length are a central concern of this paper. The presentation of the results will first present detailed results for a lag length of 4. Second, summary results for lag lengths 2, 4, 6 and 8 will also be reported. For clarity of exposition we however report the summed coefficients only. 4 Second, as these summed coefficients will contain many statistically insignificant coefficient estimates, we also report results for only those coefficients that have a t-value of higher than 1.8. 5 Third, an ECM version will be estimated and finally results of a differences specification applying a testing-down procedure will be reported. Luxembourg, Netherlands, and Sweden) of the 12 countries we find statistically significant effects of the wage share on consumption with the expected sign. A statistically significant perverse effect appears only for the UK. The large number of regressors may erode statistical significance due to multicollinearity. Therefore the last rows add up the sum of the coefficient estimates for the effects of income and the wage share.
Baseline results
< Insert Table 1> The results for the consumption function at different lag lengths are summarized in Table 2 .1.
Here only the sum of the coefficients of the wage share is reported, as this is the variable of interest. Of course, in all specifications we do control for income (at the same number of lags)
as indicated in equation (3a). Column "4lags" in Table 2 .1 corresponds to the last row of (with 6 lags) and twice (with 2 and with 6 lags) respectively. The choice of the lag length generally has little effect on the overall effect for the consumption function. For most countries the total effect is rather stable. For Germany and Sweden the effect seems to decline as the lag length increases, whereas for France and Luxembourg it seems to increase.
Germany, France and Japan show relatively strong effects of income distribution on consumption expenditures. The mean effect of a change (in the log) of the wage share on (the change in the log of) consumption is 0.134 (at 6 lags) and 0.173 (at 4 lags).
< Insert But as one can see in Table 2 .2 these perverse effects are often not statistically significant. Table 3 reports the results of the investment function (equation 1b) at a lag length of 4.
Again we find strong evidence for the expected role of income. In 9 (out of 12) countries the effect is positive and statistically significant (at the 5% level). In three cases (Ireland, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) we do note (statistically significant) perverse effects, but only in one case (the Netherlands) without an offsetting positive effect. The results for the effect of the wage share are much weaker. Only in three countries we do find a statistically significant negative effect of the wage share on investment.
< Insert Table 3> Tables 4.1 and 4.2 summarize the effects of a change in the wage share on investment at different lag lengths. Results for the investment equation are more sensitive to the lag length utilized than for the consumption function. For the majority of countries the effects are perverse at a lag length of two: increases in the wage share have a positive effect on investment. Only at higher lag lengths does the effect turn negative as expected. Investment seems to take time to react to changes in income distribution (though it is much quicker to react to changes in demand as can be seen from Table 3 ). In almost all countries the effect is larger at six lags than at 4 lags, whereas at lag length of 8 the results are less clear with several countries switching sign again. Effects are relatively strong in Australia, Canada, Germany, and France. 6 < Insert Table 4 .1> < Insert Table 4 .2> Table 4 .2 summarizes the effects when considering only statistically significant variables (again defined as t-value of higher than 1.8), which confirms the mixed results above.
Typically 8 of the 12 countries show no statistically significant effects. And typically we find two perverse cases: Ireland consistently shows negative effects (except at lag length 2) and Luxembourg has negative effects at lag lengths 4 and 6.
Overall we fail to find clear evidence that the increases in the wage share have a negative effect on investment. Results are sensitive to the lag length and mostly not statistically significant. Overall the results in Table 4 .1 are suggestive of some, though elusive, effects. A potential explanation would be that investment is mainly determined by (expected) demand as emphasized in Keynesian models.
Total effects are reported in Table 5 . These effects have been standardized as percent of GDP to facilitate interpretation. Again, Sweden show wage-led demand regimes rather consistently, that is in at least three specifications, but only the UK shows a consistent profit-led demand regime. Australia is mixed, being wage-led up to four lags and profit-led thereafter; Ireland is now profit-led only with 2 lags, but wage-led at higher lag lengths and for the US (and Japan) no statistically significant effect is found.
Robustness checks
As robustness check we also estimated a restricted ECM specification (see equations (4a) and (4b) above). The unrestricted estimations failed to support a cointegrating relation with few exceptions and often gave perverse or implausible effects in the long-run relations. Thus a simple restriction was imposed on the long-run relation: the GDP-elasticity of consumption and of investment were restricted to unity and income distribution was excluded from the long run relation. This restriction has the advantage of being simple and, at least in its first part, theoretically plausible. As the consumption share and the investment share are stable (rather then trended over time), the respective elasticities have to be equal to one. As the interest here is not in modelling the long run relation itself, but rather on the robustness of the short-run results if long-run effects are allowed for, this simple version will suffice for the task at hand. Finally, a difference specification (with 8 lags) was estimated using a testing down procedure by stepwise elimination of the coefficient with the lowest p-value until only coefficients statistically significant at the 10% level (given the standard critical t-value) remain. Such procedures are commonly used in time series econometrics, despite dubious statistical properties. Because of the repeated estimations the standard critical values do not apply.
Moreover, in the course of the elimination procedure, individual coefficients repeatedly changed signs. The results are thus regarded as unreliable and are presented as a robustness check only. We find wage-led demand regimes for seven countries and profit-led regimes for five countries. Again the profit-led countries are mostly Anglo Saxon countries.
Interpretation
Given these results it is tempting to conclude that there is a group of continental European countries (maybe together with Japan) with wage-led domestic demand regimes and a second group of Anglo-Saxon countries prone to profit-led domestic demand regimes (though these findings often rely on statistically insignificant coefficients). 7 From this Kalecki might seem more appropriate in Continental Europe and Goodwin in the Anglo-Saxon world. However, such an interpretation would be misleading: Both, scholars in the Kaleckian and in the Goodwin tradition agree on the partial effects: an increase in the wage share should stimulate consumption and depress investment. The disagreement is in the relative size of these effects and, consequently on the overall effect.
Note, however, that many of the profit-led economies are profit led for the 'wrong reason'. According to the Goodwin story countries should have profit-led demand regimes, because the effect of a change in the wage share on investment is stronger than that on consumption. However, the most consistently profit-led economy according to our findings, the UK, has a perverse effect in the consumption function, but no particularly strong (or statistically significant) investment effect. Ireland also has perverse (though not statistically significant) consumption effects and perverse investment effects in many specifications. For the US also about half of the results for investment and consumption are perverse, with none of the effects being statistically significant at all. In other words, the profit-led economies are not profit led for the reasons implied in Goodwin's theory of the business cycle. On the other hand, those countries for which the results for investment and consumption are well behaved (Germany, France, Netherlands and Sweden) almost consistently show wage-led demand regimes. The wage-led European economies are thus in line with the Kaleckian argument.
7 It may be tempting to associate the Anglo-Saxon liberal market economies with a profit-led demand regime and the European welfare states with a wage-led regime. An analysis of the effects of different welfare regimes and financial systems does not support such an expectation. As welfare states come with a more egalitarian income distribution, one would expect the savings differential to be lower in Europe than in the Anglo-Saxon economies.
Differences in the financial systems will have complex effects. In a bank-based system the credit lines of firms may be less dependent on recent profits (because of trust-based relations) than in market-based financial systems (where contracts are predominantly short term). This might be a reason for investment to be more profit-sensitive in Anglo-Saxon countries. However, if (as it is sometimes argued) market-based financial systems are more supportive of innovation, one might expect investment to depend less on recent profits.
Rather than a Kaleckian group of wage-led European countries and a Goodwinian group of profit-led Anglo-Saxon countries, we find a well-behaved group of wage-led (and thus Kaleckian) European countries and a second group of countries (which are predominantely Anglo-Saxon) with perverse distribution effects in consumption. The burning question for the types of Post-Keynesian models estimated here, is thus why somepredominantely Anglo-Saxon -countries show a perverse consumption differential. Neither
Kalecki nor Goodwin offers much of an explanation here. One potential explanation would be missing variables. If asset prices were correlated with profits (a reasonable assumption) and the wealth effect in consumption were stronger in the Anglo-Saxon countries (for which there is some evidence), than the observed pattern might be the outcome. 
Conclusion. One cheer for Kalecki
Overall our results are more in line with Kalecki's theory. The savings differential is observable in most countries and is statistically significant. The investment effects of the wage share are often not statistically significant and they are usually sensitive to the specification. The Kaleckian story can explain the wage-led demand regimes for those countries where we find it. On the other hand we find little support for the Goodwin story of the demand side. Those countries for which we find profit-led demand regimes rely strongly on the role of profits on consumption rather than on investment. The link between profits and investment does not seem to be strong and reliable enough to carry the weight of the Goodwin story of the business cycle. One should however note that Goodwin (1967) is a model of the business cycle whereas our analysis is not one of the business cycle as such, but focuses on one of the component of a business cycle model only: the demand function, which has a key role in the understanding of the business cycle. This paper has excluded the distribution function, which is subject to related disagreements between Marxists and Kaleckians. This would be an interesting topic for future research. decomposed from the aggregate results (rather than estimated as behavioural equations). They use quarterly data and use the cyclical component of the HP filter. They find that the US economy is in a profit-led demand regime. Three curious results can be noted. First, the direct distributional effects are very small and get strongly inflated by accelerator effects. Second, the effects of the wage share on demand have alternating signs of comparable absolute order of magnitude at different lags. This may be an indication that the proper specification ought to be in differences. Barbosa-Filho and Taylor do not test this hypothesis. Third, the decomposition gives strong perverse results in the consumption function. Indeed the (negative) effect of an increase in the wage share on consumption is larger than those on investment and net exports combined. This result is at odds with much of the structuralist theory that their work is based on.
As this paper is closely related to our work, we have tried to replicate their results (using the OECD Economic Outlook dataset). While we were able to reproduce their overall results, we also confirmed several severe limitations. Second, the results are very sensitive to the lag length included. While a lag length of two gives the profit-led regime found by Barbosa-Filho and Taylor, a lag length of 4 gives wageled results. Note that in our replication as well as in the original work, the effects of distribution are indeed very small and only get economically significant once they are amplified by accelerator effects. A switching of signs of the effect due to a change in lag length is thus less surprising than it may at first appear.
Finally, we also confirm the alternating sign of the effect of the wage share on demand that Barbosa-Filho and Talyor found. An F-test failed to reject the hypothesis that the coefficients (on the coefficient of first and second lags) were identical in absolute value. In other words, a specification in difference form for the wage share is appropriate. In this case, the demand regime is wage led as the first lag has a positive sign and the second lag has a negative sign.
Overall we conclude that the results by Barbosa-Filho and Taylor (2006) suffer from several econometric problems and cannot be regarded as conclusive or robust. Tables   Table 1. Estimation results consumption function, -value -1.385 -0.083 -0.122 -0.720 0.593 -1.295 -1.037 1.257 0.803 3.174 -1.192 0.458 w(t-4) 0 Table 4 Summary of effects of a change in the wage share on investment in specifications with different lag lengths 
